CÉCI HPC Training

Connecting with SSH from Linux or Mac: Introduction and advanced topics

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Connecting with Secure SHell



- SSH context
- SSH introduction
- Getting your key
- SSH client usage and configuration
- SSH frequent mistakes
- SSH Agents, Passphrase managers
- Proxies and (pseudo-)VPNs (shuttle)
- SSH-based file transfer (SCP, rsync, SSHFS)



CÉCI is: 6 computers clusters from 5 French-speaking universities





Tier-1 facility access for CÉCI user under special conditions

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On each cluster **Storage & working nodes** are interconnected in a private network

SSH context: CÉCI infrastructure



Nic4 (ULiege)

• Example

Lemaitre3 (UCLouvain)



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User must connect to the frontend to

- access its storage data and edit files
- submit jobs to the working nodes
- compiling and debugging
- transfer data
- Do not run heavy jobs in the frontend



frontends access is protected by firewall rules



With the Firewall rules, we can approximate the connections by logical **private university network**



Connections to frontends done via **SSH** From a CÉCI university network

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An SSH identity uses **asymmetric cryptography** with **a pair of keys**, one private and one public

When you ask for a new or renew a CÉCI account at https://login.ceci-hpc.be, 2 keys are generated using your passphrase





The private key is **encrypted by the passphrase** and **sent by mail** to the user.

It must be stored in a safe place in your computer.



\$ cat id_rsa.ceci

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----Proc-Type: 4, ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC, 798194AFB2800B27

KnvjN+KM4NogUADgdVI7GawGEmxJtXl2NKbezDyI8aeUAYxHemgThcRMswe2DAPs fCeAJkTZ/B23uAWRppVvuPwJtp/AD3cvYxY5jBvSwVlAUdrf0JauegGc99CqvDEV

••

wT/yGuuRi9xfn6/yY7wTDxeaJg5WRd54oq0jbpTPUQmZWjJ1cuzBNiioNBXAFTGD OJkZChE7fLD+C7kvYH0J6u4NiXUWqVheNerl0OnCZuM770gY5P0Q7w== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

For security reasons CÉCI does not keep a copy of the private key.

If you loose It, forget the passphrase or think it is compromised you must **retrieve a new key** at https://login.ceci-hpc.be



Public key is placed in frontends for authentication.

\$ cat id_rsa.ceci.pub

nic4

ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA2U59janaM1uhC4R1yL4Ioz1x4FvQ6a Q0tqIv9c6EHGj2wafVG8bxR1StYYecQ1oaY2C3AUeu9bTjtH9Rj5IP1vFf4OPAFMgU5 9SFabgeCZcNJbvZdpyI3mrEhTZLRTNhlohRoMACRot7rAxiKg62j2myfwWPXygwC4j 2N6uY5bPMMi9Tp0anjEJwzSBFDH+3gI+EkR4LutgWzqKYo61RXuhhs3kPYOKvT+OJ 3qgDF73z1VXhBTBH4d+mIKnQKzvRiRIsnG9/Jda1PHHqd/7AdezZgWdFilE6wPUthY p8anh+GRy0veNUHwus0aUpIRkxXAOp0viKQdZEXtSdKMIxnQ==



 \mathbf{U} \mathbf{O}

Public







Each frontend as it's own private and public key



SSH introduction: protocol



The SSH connection and authentication protocol has 5 main phases

SSH introduction: protocol



- 1) Establish TCP Connection to frontend
- 2) Identification string Exchange (check if good ssh version)
- 3) Algorithm negotiation (which encryption algorithm is used)
- 4) Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (User gets frontend's public key)
- 5) User Authentication and Authorization (User send his/her login and public key)

Getting your private key



Users without email account access, without CÉCI university email or who does not need a CÉCI account can use a key for one of the guest accounts.

http://www.cism.ucl.ac.be/Services/Formations/pk/

Save the private key in a file named id_rsa.ceci

Getting your private key



Users with email account access can ask for an account at:

https://login.ceci-hpc.be/init/

- Click 'Create Account'
- Type in your email address
- Click on the link sent to you by email.
- Fill-in the form and hit the "Submit" button.
- Wait ... (A sysadmin is reviewing your information).
- receive your private key by email.
- Store the id_rsa.ceci file in a safe location.

SSH client : Linux & MacOS



SSH client for connection is already installed



1) Save your key id_rsa.ceci file from your e-mail to your home directory

- 2) Open a terminal
- 3) Create the .ssh directory if it does not exist

\$ mkdir ~/.ssh

- 4) Move your key to this directory
- \$ mv id_rsa.ceci ~/.ssh/.
- 5) Change the permissions of the file so that only you can read it

\$ chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci

6) Check the permissions. The follow command :

\$ ls -l ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci

Must output -rw----- permissions

7) Now you can connect to a CÉCI cluster, e.g. Hmem, with

\$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci yourlogin@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be



Example

\$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci jcabrera@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be



Example

\$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci jcabrera@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be The authenticity of host 'hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be (130.104.1.220)' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is 06:54:39:a0:5c:b5:56:b3:29:9e:96:67:a0:4a:c1:ff. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?

FIRST TIME you connect to a frontend from a client, you will be asked to accept the Public Key Check the key fingerprint from CÉCI web site http://www.ceci-hpc.be/clusters.html#hmem

SUPPORT: egs-cism@listes.uclouvan.be

Server SSH key fingerprint: (What's this?) MD5: 06:54:39:a0:5c:b5:56:b3:29:9e:96:67:a0:4a:c1:ff SHA256:

Xi4r0aNViNgg9KjnENiUFkEWPwnJGAjbknlX+m7CIm0



Example

\$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci jcabrera@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be The authenticity of host 'hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be (130.104.1.220)' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is 06:54:39:a0:5c:b5:56:b3:29:9e:96:67:a0:4a:c1:ff. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes Warning: Permanently added 'hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be' (RSA) to the list of known hosts. Enter passphrase for key '/home/jcabrera/.ssh/id rsa.ceci':

Now, the hmem public key is stored in your know_host file

Enter the **passphrase** you set when you create the account This will decrypt your private key



Example

You are now connected !!

SSH client usage: Frequent mistakes



The permissions on your key file are not correct

If, after running ssh hmem, for instance, you see something like:

It means that **Permissions** 0644 for '/home/dfr/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci' **are too open**. Change them to 600 as explained previously

\$ chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci

SSH client usage: Frequent mistakes



You did not specify the correct path to your SSH key

If, after running ssh, you are being asked for a password directly,

\$ ssh hmem
dfr@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be's password:

it means that your SSH client did not use the SSH key. Make sure you either used the -i option or that your .ssh/config is properly configured.

You used a wrong username or tried to connect before your keys are synchronized

If, after running ssh, you are being asked for a passphrase, then a password,

\$ ssh hmem Enter passphrase for key '/home/dfr/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci': dfr@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be's password:

it often means that the user name you are using is not the correct one. It could also mean that you are trying to connect with the new private key while it has not been synchronized to the cluster yet (clusters are not synchronized simultaneously you need to **wait ~30 min**.)



You can use -v, -vv or -vvv to troubleshooting a session

	<pre>\$ ssh -v -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci yourlogin@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be</pre>
Identification string Exchange	 debug1: Local version string SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.6.1p1 Ubuntu-2ubuntu2 debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version OpenSSH_5.3
Algorithm negotiation	debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange	The authenticity of host 'hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be (130.104.1.220)' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is 06:54:39:a0:5c:b5:56:b3:29:9e:96:67:a0:4a:c1:ff. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes Warning: Permanently added 'hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be' (RSA) to the list of known hosts. debug1: ssh_rsa_verify: signature correct server authenticity debug1: SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received communication is encrypted with symmetric key
User Authentication and Authorization	 debug1: Offering RSA public key: /home/jcabrera/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci debug1: Server accepts key: pkalg ssh-rsa blen 277 Enter passphrase for key '/home/jcabrera/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci': debug1: Authentication succeeded (publickey). user authenticity

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Exercise



Make your first connection to hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be

SSH configuration



You can reduce the length of the follow command:

\$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci yourlogin@hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be

Edit or create the configuration file ~*I.ssh/config* and add the contents generated by the following script:

http://www.ceci-hpc.be/sshconfig.html

SSH configuration



Generalities -----

Host hmem lemaitre3 hercules dragon1 vega nic4

ForwardAgent yes

ForwardX11 yes

IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id rsa.ceci

CÉCI clusters -----

Host hmem

Hostname hmem.cism.ucl.ac.be

User jsmith

Host lemaitre3 ...

Host hercules ...

Host dragon1 ...

Host vega ...

Host nic4 ...

FowardX11 is needed to open any host program in the client display.

With **ForwardAgent** the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side

Now you can connect with the command:

\$ ssh hmem

Exercise



- Create your configuration file
- Use the CECI Wizard to add all frontends
- And connect
- execute xeyes command on hmem



SSH Agents, Passphrase managers



Use an SSH agent which will remember the passphrase so you do not have to type it in each time you issue the SSH command. 1) make sure you have an agent running

\$ ssh-add -1
Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.

2) If you get "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent." start an agent with

\$ eval \$(ssh-agent)

3) add you key. Your key is decrypted and stored in memory

\$ ssh-add ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci Enter passphrase for /home/jcabrera/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci: Identity added: /home/jcabrera/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci (/home/jcabrera/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci)

4) check the loaded key

\$ ssh-add -1
2048 20:6c:8c:cd:e8:e6:9b:4f:8c:9c:d6:8a:eb:37:6d:17 /home/jcabrera/.ssh/id rsa.ceci (RSA)

5) You can connect to the host without set the passphrase

\$ ssh hmem

SSH Agents, Passphrase managers



You can have an ssh-agent started automatically at login by using password managing software such as

Mac OS Keychain, KDE KWallet, Gnome Keyring (Seahorse), etc.

Gnome Keyring loads all private keys in ~/.ssh which have the corresponding public key.

You can generate the public key with the command

ssh-keygen -y -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci > ~/.ssh/id_rsa.ceci.pub

Exercise



- Launch the ssh-agent
- Add your private key and connect.

You will be asked for you passphrase for the last time





All input and output data from client is forwarded to the host through the gateway

\$ ssh -o 'ProxyCommand ssh gatewayuser@gatewayadress -W %h:%p' hmem

Replace gatewayuser@gatewayadress by your university login name and gateway address

\$ ssh -o 'ProxyCommand ssh jcabrera@gwceci.cism.ucl.ac.be -W %h:%p' hmem cabrera@hall.cism.ucl.ac.be's password: Last login: Mon Aug 17 14:36:50 2015 from vml.cism.ucl.ac.be Welcome to

HighMemory CISM-CECI cluster

Proxies and (pseudo-)VPNs



Proxy Connection via gateway

Gatewayadress:

- UCL: gwceci.cism.ucl.ac.be
- Unamur: hal.unamur.be

For UCL and UNamur user can connect through a gateway Use the wizard http://www.ceci-hpc.be/sshconfig.html

UNamur Specific ------

Host gwhal

Hostname hal.unamur.be

User jbcabrer

Host *%gwhal

ProxyCommand ssh -W %h:%p gwhal

To connect just type:

\$ ssh hmem%gwhal

You can do the same for others cluster

Proxies and (pseudo-)VPNs



You can redirect throw ssh tunnel all ports for all or some of your IP connections via the gateway.

This can be done with the python program sshuttle.

To use it, you need to have root or sudo permission.

```
$ wget https://github.com/sshuttle/sshuttle/archive/v0.78.4.zip
$ unzip v0.78.4.zip
$ cd sshuttle-0.78.4/
$ sudo ./setup.py install
```

Redirect connections for all IP

\$./sshuttle -r jbcabrer@hal.unamur.be 0.0.0/0

Now you can access to https://login.ceci-hpc.be/ from outside the university Check IP at https://www.whatismyip.com/

Redirect only UCL IP

\$./sshuttle -r gwceci 130.104.1.0/24

You can also install sshuttle with pip, apt-get, yum or brew

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You can copy files/directories back and forth between computers

- Verify your agent is running and hmem is defined in your config file
- Create a temporary directory with dummy files

\$ mkdir -p coursssh/scptest; touch coursssh/scptest/file{1..4}.txt

• Copy the directory to your home directory in hmem and check

\$ scp -r coursssh/scptest hmem:coursssh/.
\$ ssh hmem 'ls coursssh/scptest/'

Copy it back

\$ scp -r hmem:coursssh/scptest coursssh/scptest2

Copy via proxy (from outside the universities network)

\$ scp -r coursssh/scptest2 hmem%:coursssh/.

Copy between frontends. (direct connection between frontends)

\$ scp -r hmem:coursssh/scptest hercules:coursssh/.

To use the alias hercules your ~/.ssh/config file must be set in hmem

For a copy throw your computer use -3

\$ scp -r -3 hmem:coursssh/scptest hercules:coursssh/.



rsync is widely used for backups and mirroring and as an improved copy command for everyday use

Most common usage is to synchronize files with archive option -a and compress option z. If you want to get a copy of your hard work you did in the frontend to your laptop:

\$ ssh hmem 'mkdir coursssh/rsynctest; touch coursssh/rsynctest/file{1..4}.txt'
\$ rsync -avz --progress hmem:coursssh/rsynctest coursssh/.

Modify a file at the frontend and synchronize

\$ ssh hmem 'echo "Adding hello1 word in hmem" >> coursssh/rsynctest/file4.txt'
\$ rsync -avz --progress hmem:coursssh/rsynctest coursssh/.

Modify a file in your computer and prevent Overwrite when synchronize -u

\$ echo 'Adding hello in client' > coursssh/rsynctest/file3.txt \$ rsync -avzu --progress hmem:coursssh/rsynctest coursssh/.

Delete a file at the frontend and force delete it in your computer.

\$ ssh hmem rm coursssh/rsynctest/file1.txt
\$ rsync -avz --del --progress hmem:coursssh/rsynctest coursssh/.



Use SSHFS to mount a remote file system - accessible via SSH

Linux install:

Debian, Ubuntu

\$ sudo apt-get install sshfs

Fedora/CentOs

\$ yum install sshfs

Mac Install:

Install FUSE and SSHFS from https://osxfuse.github.io/

C.E.C.I

Example: Mount your CECIHOME

Create a local repository to mout the CÉCI home

\$ mkdir CECIHOME

Mount the remote CÉCI Home

\$ cluster=hmem;

\$ sshfs -o uid=`id -u` -o gid=`id -g` \$cluster:\$(ssh \$cluster 'echo \$CECIHOME') / CECIHOME

the command:

\$ ssh \$cluster 'echo \$CECIHOME'

gives the path of CECIHOME in the cluster Create file in the mounted directory

\$ echo 'file content' > CECIHOME/file_fuse.txt

Check the file content in the frontend

\$ ssh hmem 'cat \$CECIHOME/file_fuse.txt'

disconnect

\$ fusermount -u ~/clusters_dirs/hmem

Exercise



• Mount CECIHOME from your university frontend.

Thanks



Thank you for your attention

RFC 3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1

8.2.1 Signature generation operation

RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN (K, M)

Input:

- K signer's RSA private key
- M message to be signed, an octet string

Output:

S signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Errors: "message too long"; "RSA modulus too short"

Steps:

 EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce an encoded message EM of length k octets:

EM = EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE (M, k).

If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus too short" and stop.

- 2. RSA signature:
 - a. Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2):

m = OS2IP (EM).

b. Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to the RSA private key K and the message representative m to produce an integer signature representative s:

s = RSASP1 (K, m).

c. Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

S = I2OSP (s, k).

3. Output the signature S.

8.2.2 Signature verification operation

RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)

Input:

- (n, e) signer's RSA public key
- M message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string
- S signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Output: "valid signature" or "invalid signature"

Errors: "message too long"; "RSA modulus too short"

Steps:

- 1. Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k octets, output "invalid signature" and stop.
- 2. RSA verification:
 - a. Convert the signature S to an integer signature representative s (see Section 4.2):

s = OS2IP (S).

b. Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to the RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative s to produce an integer message representative m:

m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s).

If RSAVP1 outputs "signature representative out of range," output "invalid signature" and stop.

c. Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM

of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

EM' = I2OSP (m, k).

If I2OSP outputs "integer too large," output "invalid signature" and stop.

3. EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce a second encoded message EM' of length k octets:

EM' = EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE (M, k).

If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus too short" and stop.

4. Compare the encoded message EM and the second encoded message EM'.
If they are the same, output "valid signature"; otherwise, output "invalid signature." The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange provides a shared secret that cannot be determined by either party alone. The key exchange is combined with a signature with the host key to provide host authentication. This key exchange method provides explicit server authentication as defined in Section 7.

The following steps are used to exchange a key. In this, C is the client; S is the server; p is a large safe prime; g is a generator for a subgroup of GF(p); q is the order of the subgroup; V_S is S's identification string; V_C is C's identification string; K_S is S's public host key; I_C is C's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message and I_S is S's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message that have been exchanged before this part begins.

- 1. C generates a random number x (1 < x < q) and computes $e = g^x \mod p$. C sends e to S.
- 2. S generates a random number y (0 < y < q) and computes f = g^y mod p. S receives e. It computes K = e^y mod p, H = hash(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K) (these elements are encoded according to their types; see below), and signature s on H with its private host key. S sends (K_S || f || s) to C. The signing operation may involve a second hashing operation.
- 3. C verifies that K_S really is the host key for S (e.g., using certificates or a local database). C is also allowed to accept the key without verification; however, doing so will render the protocol insecure against active attacks (but may be desirable for practical reasons in the short term in many environments). C then computes K = f^x mod p, H = hash(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K), and verifies the signature s on H.

Values of 'e' or 'f' that are not in the range [1, p-1] MUST NOT be sent or accepted by either side. If this condition is violated, the key exchange fails. This is implemented with the following messages. The hash algorithm for computing the exchange hash is defined by the method name, and is called HASH. The public key algorithm for signing is negotiated with the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT messages.

First, the client sends the following:

byte SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT mpint e

The server then responds with the following:

byte SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY string server public host key and certificates (K_S) mpint f string signature of H

The hash H is computed as the HASH hash of the concatenation of the following:

- string V_C, the client's identification string (CR and LF excluded)
- string V_S, the server's identification string (CR and LF excluded)
- string I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- string I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- string K_S, the host key
- mpint e, exchange value sent by the client
- mpint f, exchange value sent by the server
- mpint K, the shared secret

This value is called the exchange hash, and it is used to authenticate the key exchange. The exchange hash SHOULD be kept secret.

The signature algorithm MUST be applied over H, not the original data. Most signature algorithms include hashing and additional padding (e.g., "ssh-dss" specifies SHA-1 hashing). In that case, the data is first hashed with HASH to compute H, and H is then hashed with SHA-1 as part of the signing operation.

7. Public Key Authentication Method: "publickey" RFC 4252

The only REQUIRED authentication 'method name' is "publickey" authentication. All implementations MUST support this method; however, not all users need to have public keys, and most local policies are not likely to require public key authentication for all users in the near future.

With this method, the possession of a private key serves as authentication. This method works by sending a signature created with a private key of the user. The server MUST check that the key is a valid authenticator for the user, and MUST check that the signature is valid. If both hold, the authentication request MUST be accepted; otherwise, it MUST be rejected. Note that the server MAY require additional authentications after successful authentication.

Private keys are often stored in an encrypted form at the client host, and the user must supply a passphrase before the signature can be generated. Even if they are not, the signing operation involves some expensive computation. To avoid unnecessary processing and user interaction, the following message is provided for querying whether authentication using the "publickey" method would be acceptable.

byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST string user name in ISO-10646 UTF-8 encoding [RFC3629]

string service name in US-ASCII

string "publickey"

boolean FALSE

string public key algorithm name

string public key blob

Public key algorithms are defined in the transport layer specification [SSH-TRANS]. The 'public key blob' may contain certificates.

Any public key algorithm may be offered for use in authentication. In particular, the list is not constrained by what was negotiated during key exchange. If the server does not support some algorithm, it MUST simply reject the request.

The server MUST respond to this message with either SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE or with the following:

byte	SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
string	public key algorithm name from the request
string	public key blob from the request

To perform actual authentication, the client MAY then send a signature generated using the private key. The client MAY send the signature directly without first verifying whether the key is acceptable. The signature is sent using the following packet:

byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST string user name string service name string "publickey" boolean TRUE string public key algorithm name string public key to be used for authentication string signature

The value of 'signature' is a signature by the corresponding private key over the following data, in the following order:

string session identifier byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST string user name string service name string "publickey" boolean TRUE string public key algorithm name string public key to be used for authentication

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When the server receives this message, it MUST check whether the supplied key is acceptable for authentication, and if so, it MUST check whether the signature is correct.

If both checks succeed, this method is successful. Note that the server may require additional authentications. The server MUST respond with SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS (if no more authentications are needed), or SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (if the request failed, or more authentications are needed).

The following method-specific message numbers are used by the "publickey" authentication method.

SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60